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Abstract
There are several basic configurations of corporate governance according to the separation of 
ownership and control ( Jensen’s theory). Effective governance is described as a situation when 
an owner (or group of owners) keeps the right to ratify and monitor strategic decisions while 
management has the right to initiate and implement those decisions. There are two particular 
situations how this recommendation is partially broken and both situations are linked to CEO 
duality. The first case happens when an owner loses or does not exercise the right to monitor 
management of the organization and is termed as the strong executive. The second case is called 
the strong ownership and is distinguished by an owner taking over implementations of the deci-
sions. The focus of the study was to explore particularly configurations of the strong executive 
and the strong governance. A mixed method research design was chosen to explore the differ-
ences between the basic governance configurations. The sample was chosen by purposive sam-
pling and covered a hundred for-profit organizations of all size and from all sectors of economy. 
The data were collected through interviews with representatives, mainly members of top man-
agement. We revealed that both of these configurations can bear good corporate performance 
but also bigger risks. The strong executive is typical for organizations with dispersed ownership 
or a publicly owned organization and the performance of the organization is fully dependent 
on competencies but also personalities of managers. This configuration contains a high risk of 
misuse of authority. The strong ownership is effective in small organizations while in a larger 
organization leads to an overexertion of owners and low performance because they usually face 
problems to keep focus on the strategic issues of the organization.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The effective governance is characterized by separation of ownership and control. The level 
of separation is determined by the decomposition of decision making process combined with 
matching the steps of decision making process to owners and managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983, 
Goranova et al, 2007). Jensen and Fuller (2002) decompose the decision making process into 
four main phases: initiation, ratification, implementation and monitoring. Ratification and moni-
toring are linked to exercise of control rights while initiation and implementation are linked 
to executive and managerial rights. The optimum is described when shareholders (or owners) 
hold control rights and executive rights are designated to managers. Moreover, this optimum is 
based on clearly outlined organizational elements representing interest of the shareholders. The 
shareholders are represented by control body (board of trusties, supervisory board, supervisory 
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council, etc.) while managers carry implement ratified strategies. (Crosslan & Hambrick, 2007). 
There are clear rules for a nomination into the control body and also for an election or an ap-
pointment of executives. In other words, good governance is based on rules precisely defining 
the discretionary trust of the managers on one side and assuring the control mechanism for 
shareholders. Thus, the roles of managers and shareholders are clearly outlined and do not over-
lap. This governance configuration is in accordance with the most acknowledged codes of good 
governance, such as Sarbaness-Oxley Act of 2002 or OECD Principles of Good Governance 
(2004). Only such governance configuration is assessed as the effective governance. 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries went through significant changes in previous 
twenty years and these changes significantly influenced entire economy. Corporate governance 
in these countries is often not in coherence with corporate governance recommendation and 
codes successfully applied in well developed economies (Hashi, 2003; Meyer, 2003; Wright et al, 
2005, Son et al, 2011). This is caused by different development of appropriate corporate govern-
ance mechanisms and initial complete absence of necessary prerequisites such as appropriate 
legal structure or financial institutes (Wright, Buck, & Filatotchev, 2005). One of the key reasons 
of difference development of CEE countries is identified in speed of transformation. Meyer 
(2003) denotes that “The transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe have privatized 
their economies at an unprecedented speed in the 1990s” (Meyer, 2003, p. 31). Meyer sees the 
main problem in the relation between owners and managers. Either managers or owners often 
crossed the lines of their authorities and meddled in the rights of the other stakeholders. As a 
result, it is likely that CEE countries may thus develop unique forms of corporate governance. 
In our paper, we focus on two particular types of corporate governance where the rules of good 
corporate governance are breached. 
The rules of good corporate governance are very often breached by CEO duality. This duality is 
frequent in CEE countries (Aguilera & Jackson, 2010). Very often asked question is linked to the 
relation between CEO duality and organizational performance. The relation has not been suc-
cessfully clarified yet and the results of the studies are inconsistent (Boyd, 1995). Elsayed (2007) 
examined the influence of CEO duality on corporate performance. He found that the impact of 
CEO duality varies across industries. Moreover, he discovered a relation of corporate perform-
ance and CEO duality when corporate performance was low. In contrast, Peng et al (2010) found 
that CEO duality positively moderates firm performance in private-owned enterprises while it 
negatively moderate firm performance in state-owned enterprises. Thus, the form of ownership 
appears to be a significant factor. This idea was partially supported by Chang and Zhang (2011). 
They revealed that institutional investors buy the shares of the firms with good governance 
quality governance structure. In addition, board configuration itself is another factor influencing 
corporate performance (Muller-Kahle & Lewellyn, 2011). Large discretion of the CEO may lead 
to better performance of the manager and also the organization and thus the large discretion can 
be beneficial to the owners (Rodrigues & António, 2011). The risk comes from the asymmetry of 
information between the CEO and the owners. The CEO can misuse the asymmetry of informa-
tion in his or her own profit. To provide more in-depth analysis of CEO duality we distinguish 
two types of duality depending on a shift of rights in decision making process. 
The first case of CEO duality occurs when shareholders are excluded from monitoring and is 
termed as the strong executive. It appears when an executive organ carries out the monitoring 
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functions while shareholder’s role becomes formal but symbolic (Boyd, 1994). Consequently, the 
relation between shareholders and managers weakens (Monem, 2011). In extreme case, share-
holders have no control over the organization and are “in the hands” of the managers. The de-
scribed situation is a possible consequence of CEO duality when appointed manager takes over 
monitoring rights, for instance CEO becomes the head of the control authority (Kong-Hee et 
al, 2009). There are several causes of the exclusion. First cause is linked with the speed of trans-
formation and privatization (Meyer, 2003, Dharwadkar et al, 2008). The speed of privatization 
was too fast to allow separation of managerial and control rights. Second, effective monitoring is 
also influenced by the structure and number of shareholders. For example, there is a big differ-
ence between dispersed ownership of thousand shareholders, ownership of state and ownership 
of one or few individual shareholders. The more there are shareholders and the more dispersed 
is the ownership the bigger is probability of exclusion shareholders from effective monitoring. 
Third, a personality of CEO plays a significant role (Horner, 2010). After the communism era 
there was a lack of experienced managers and almost anyone could become a CEO. Hence, many 
incompetent people ended up as CEOs and they did not allow shareholders to control. And 
finally, the level of shareholder’s attention to monitoring depends on deviation in performance 
of an organization (Tuggle et al., 2010). Performance increase reduces shareholder’s attention 
to monitoring and thus strengthens the discretion of managers. Paradoxically, the better is the 
organizational performance the bigger is the possibility of losing the control of shareholders and 
vice versa.
Another case of CEO duality is characterized by owners involved in management of the organi-
zation and is termed as the strong ownership. The owner is not separated from the executive, 
takes over the managerial rights and is represented in all bodies of an organization (Harris & 
Helfat, 1998). Typically, the shareholder takes over the step of implementation. Thus, the share-
holder holds the managerial functions (Kang & Zardkoohi, 2005). In such configuration, it is 
necessary to emphasize clear outline of the governance structure (Pirožek, 2007). The roles of 
the owners and executive must be clearly stated and must not overlap. There should be rules for 
nomination into the control body and also clear rules for appointment of executives. Yet, the 
discretionary trust of the managers should be clearly stated. The strong ownership is a typical 
governance configuration for small enterprises or family companies. However, there is a turn-
ing point in expansion of a firm from which it is impossible for the owner to handle all the 
managerial duties and the owner should appoint professional CEO. The last case of governance 
configuration occurs when these recommendations are broken and is termed as the ineffective 
governance. This is represented by very unclear or vague governance structure where roles of 
shareholders and managers are not defined at all.
2. mEThODOlOgy
We used a mixed method research design to answer the research question. Specifically, we em-
ployed concurrent equal status design as we collected and processed quantitative and qualitative 
data at the same time (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2009). We combined a qualitative data obtained 
through interviews with quantitative obtained through interviews and document analysis. 100 
Czech for-profit organizations were chosen to be involved in the study. Purposive sampling 
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was chosen to achieve the optimal representativeness (Teddlie & Yu, 2007): the organizations 
represented all sectors in accordance with the proportion in the Czech economy (Blažek et al, 
2011) which was done on the basis of NACE codes. There was also a balance of domestically and 
internationally owned organizations. Moreover, the sample comprised organizations of all sizes. 
The interviews were conducted with representatives of the organizations, usually with a member 
of top-level management. The interviews were recorded, analyzed and particular variables were 
transformed to category scale. Financial and other quantitative data were collected from avail-
able corporate documents. The quantitative data were processed employing MS Excel and SPSS 
while qualitative data obtained through interviews helped to interpret the results. 
The objective of the study was to survey the differences between the main governance configu-
rations: the effective governance, the strong executive and the strong ownership. We used the 
quantitative data to test two hypotheses. Our first hypothesis was based on findings of differ-
ences in governance between CEE countries and well developed countries. Previous studies 
indicate that CEE countries may have developed different governance especially in relations 
between owners and managers. Hence, we tested the relation between the owner’s residency 
and the governance configuration. The second hypothesis is derived from presumption that the 
effective governance configuration brings better firm performance in comparison with other 
governance configurations. Thus, we tested the relation of the governance configuration and the 
firm performance. 
H1: There is a difference in the governance configuration between domestic and internation-
ally owned organizations.
H2: The effective governance configuration leads to better firm performance.
Return on Assets indicator (ROA) was used as the criterion of firm performance. ROA is a pre-
ferred measure to examine the relation between performance and corporate governance because 
it is not affected by leverage, extraordinary items and other discretionary items (Core, Guay, & 
Rusticus, 2006). In coherence with this finding, we found numerous studies examining corpo-
rate governance where ROA was used as a performance measure (Balabat, Teylor & Walter, 2004; 
Brown & Caylor, 2009; Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Christensen, Kent, & Stewart, 2010; Kiel & 
Nicholson, 2003; Lehmann & Weigand, 2000). The financial data were acquired from official 
annual reports. 
Further on, qualitative data were used to scrutinize the cases of the strong executive and the 
strong ownership, since the impact of those two configurations is not clear and our aim was to 
explore these two configurations. We were looking mainly for the circumstances where these 
governance configurations inhibit or improve the firm performance and explored these cases.
3. RESUlTS
We successfully collected data from 83 organizations from the sample of hundred selected or-
ganizations what gives the response rate of 83 %. Such a big response rate was reached due to 
interview-based survey. Seventeen organizations were excluded from the survey because they 
were not able to provide the data we requested. The most common reason of exclusion an or-
ganization from the survey was linked to the low transparency and unavailability of financial 
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statements. Moreover, some of the organizations did not publish the annual report even though 
it was their legal liability. Nevertheless, 83 organizations is a sufficient sample to provide satisfac-
tory results. 
The basic organizational characteristics show the representativeness of the sample. 23 organiza-
tions were small enterprises, 20 were medium enterprises and 40 were large enterprises. The 
legal form of the sample organizations reflects the population in the Czech Republic too. The 
largest number of organizations (27) comes from the manufacturing sector which also reflects 
the situation in the Czech economy. The sample comprised of domestically and internationally 
owned organizations – 32 organizations were owned by domestic owners and 51 had an inter-
national owner. Table 1 depicts the distribution of the organizations according to NACE codes 
and domestic/internationally owned enterprises. Two main legal forms dominated the sample 
– limited liability company (LTD) (45 in total) and joint stock company ( JSC) (35 in total). Co-
operative association as rather traditional legal form of ownership in the Czech Republic was 
represented by two organizations only. Further on, we analyzed financial statements to evaluate 
performance of the organizations. Return on Assets indicator (ROA) was used to measure the 
corporate performance. Average ROA in the sample was 4.9 % with minimum of –91 % and 
maximum of 61 %. The standard deviation of the sample was .1687. The average ROA was used 
to distinguish the organizations with above average ROA and below average ROA. Overall, 38 
organizations reached above average ROA and 45 were below the average.
Tab. 1 – The distribution of the sample NACE coding. Source: Own research
NACE Domestic International Total
A Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1 0 1
C Manufacturing 8 19 27
D
Electricity, gas, steam and air condi-
tioning supply 
2 1 3
E
Water supply; sewerage; waste manage-
ment and remediation activities
1 0 1
F Construction 4 3 7
G
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of 
motor vehicles and motorcycles 
2 6 8
H Transporting and storage 2 1 3
I
Accommodation and food service 
activities 
1 1 2
J Information and communication 2 3 5
K Financial and insurance activities 0 7 7
M
Professional, scientific and technical 
activities
5 3 8
N
Administrative and support service 
activities
0 3 3
1
P Education 1 1 2
Q Human health and social work activities 1 2 3
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 2 1 3
Total 32 51 83
The objective of the study was to survey the differences between the main governance configu-
rations: the effective governance, the strong executive and the strong ownership (ineffective 
governance was observed in an only organization which prevents us from doing general conclu-
sions about the consequences). First of all, exact classification was crucial for further work. The 
effective governance was classified in 49 organizations, 18 organizations were characterized as 
having the strong ownership, 15 organizations were classified as having the strong executive, 
thus leaving the only organization with the ineffective governance. Table 2 depicts the basic 
characteristics of the sample segmented according to the governance configuration and in ad-
dition, the organizations were subdivided into domestic and international organizations and 
split by the legal form. The table shows that the effective governance prevails in international 
organizations. The ratio of prevalence of individual governance configurations is similar in both 
major legal forms. The frequency of strong executive was bigger in domestic companies. The 
difference is more obvious using ratios – the strong executive was observed in 28 % of domes-
tic organizations and only in 11 % of international organizations. Consequently, the difference 
between domestic and international organizations was statistically tested. We reject the equality 
of domestic and international organizations (α=.044) and thus, we confirm the difference in 
governance between domestic and international organizations. This gives us the support for the 
first hypothesis. 
Tab. 2 – Sample according to legal form and corporate governance approach. Source: Own 
research
Corporate governance configuration – absolute numbers
Size of the 
organization
Effective  
governance
Strong  
Ownership
Strong executive
Ineffective  
governance
Total
Domes-
tic
In-
terna-
tional
Domes-
tic
In-
terna-
tional
Domes-
tic
In-
terna-
tional
Domes-
tic
In-
terna-
tional
Joint stock 
company
3 16 1 8 4 3 35
Limited 
liability com-
pany
12 15 5 4 5 3 1 45
Cooperative 
association
1 1 2
Other legal 
form
1 1
Total 16 33 6 12 9 6 1 0 83
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Further on, we surveyed the effect of governance configuration on corporate performance. We 
did not find statistically significant differences between ROA of organizations with different 
governance configurations. Average ROA in the sample was 4.9 % with minimum of –91 % and 
maximum of 61 %. The standard deviation of the sample ROA was .1687. The average ROA 
was used to distinguish the organizations with above average ROA and below average ROA. 
Overall, 38 organizations reached above average ROA and 45 were below the average. Generally, 
the effective governance results in more frequent occurrence of above average ROA (26 out of 
49 cases which is 53 %), while strong ownership shows the worst impact on ROA (only five of 
eighteen cases which is 28 %). However, statistical tests do not prove the significance of the rela-
tions between governance configuration and ROA. Hence, we do not have a statistical support 
for our second hypothesis.
Next, we divided the sample according to governance approach and surveyed each governance 
configuration. We considered the legal form of organizations as a criterion to help us distinguish 
between the particular governance configurations. 19 from 35 joint stock companies in our 
sample were classified as having the effective governance; nine firms had the strong ownership 
and seven the strong executive which corresponds with the overall ratio. When we divided the 
sample according to ROA and international/domestic ownership, we revealed interesting find-
ings. The strong executive resulted in above average ROA in five of seven cases. Those cases 
were represented more by domestic owners and all those cases were large companies. Table 3 
demonstrated the distribution within joint stock companies.
Tab. 3 – The Joint stock company and its governance configuration. Source: Own research
The Joint stock company - governance configuration
Size 
of the 
organi-
zation
Effective  
governance
Strong  
ownership
Strong  
executive
Ineffective 
governance
TotalAbove 
average 
ROA
Under 
average 
ROA
Above 
average 
ROA
Under 
average 
ROA
Above 
average 
ROA
Under 
average 
ROA
Above 
average 
ROA
Under 
average 
ROA
Small 1 1 1   1   4
Medium  2  1     3
Large 7 8 2 5 5 1   28
Total 8 11 3 6 5 2 0 0 35
We analyzed limited liability companies using the same perspective i.e. dividing according to 
level of ROA and ownership. We found different distribution of ROA depending on the gov-
ernance configuration. The effective governance led in majority of cases to above average ROA 
whereas both strong ownership and strong executive resulted in below average ROA. We found a 
difference between domestic and internationally owned companies. All international LTDs with 
the strong ownership were characterized by below average ROA. The explanation was found in 
low trust in hired Czech managers. The representatives of international owners were occupied 
not only with the high level of control but they also participated in managerial duties. The only 
two successful organizations with strong ownership had a Czech owner and can be classified as 
family-controlled business. The overview of LTDs is depicted in table 4.
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Tab. 4 – The Limited liability company governance configuration. Source: Own research
The Limited liability company - governance configuration
Size 
of the 
organiza-
tion
Effective gov-
ernance
Strong owner-
ship
Strong execu-
tive
Ineffective 
governance
TotalAbove 
average 
ROA
Under 
average 
ROA
Above 
average 
ROA
Under 
average 
ROA
Above 
average 
ROA
Under 
average 
ROA
Above 
average 
ROA
Under 
average 
ROA
Small 6 5 1 3  3  1 16
Medium 3 4 1 3 1 3   15
Large 8 1  1  1   11
Total 17 10 2 7 1 7 0 1 45
4. DISCUSSION AND CONClUSION
Although effective corporate governance configuration prevails we put our effort into other 
governance configurations, specifically the strong executive and the strong ownership. These 
configurations are not in accordance with recommendations of governance codes but they can 
also bear good results. The strong ownership was appropriate in small and medium enterprises 
what is in accordance with results of previous studies (Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). On the 
other hand, the strong ownership can easily develop in the situation when the owners fail to at-
tend to strategic goals and are overburden by day-to-day routine. This is in coherence with Kang 
and Zardkoohi (2005) when long-term planning is displaced by day-to-day routine and monitor-
ing rights are neglected. It is important for the owners to recognize such situation and to appoint 
professional management before they lose strategic focus. Yet, the owners must delegate only 
the right to initiate and to implement while they have to keep the right to ratify and to monitor. 
In our research, the strong ownership more often resulted in below average ROA. Majority of 
those organizations did not manage to appoint professional managers in the right moment and 
those organizations were the case of owners’ overburden by day-to-day routine instead of focus 
on long term objectives. Furthermore, we discovered a phenomenon of the strong ownership 
within larger international organizations. We found the reasons in low trust in Czech environ-
ment and Czech managers when international owner tended to meddle into managerial rights of 
Czech managers. In conclusion, the strong ownership is usually effective in small (and especially 
family run) organizations while in larger organization leads to overexertion of owners and low 
performance.
The strong executive is the most unpredictable governance configuration. The majority of joint 
stock companies (five of seven) classified as having the strong executive produced above aver-
age ROA. The explanation was found in very competent managers leading those organizations. 
Moreover, the strong executive is desirable configuration in certain situation such as crisis man-
agement. However, a warning is necessary: strong executive makes owners dependent on the 
managers and therefore the personality of a manager is crucial (Horner, 2010) and there is a 
high risk of misuse of the authority. The strong executive also did not work in LTDs and smaller 
organizations. To illustrate, there are very well known corporate scandals caused by strong ex-
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ecutive. Enron scandal is probably the best known corporate scandal in the world and up-to-date 
scandal emerged in the Czech Republic last year. The largest Czech lottery company Sazka went 
bankrupt as a result of very strong executive – the CEO had almost unlimited power over the 
board.
Our study has its limitation. First limitation is caused by the size of the sample and thus, the 
generalization of the results. We identified 15 organizations with the strong executive and 18 
organizations with the strong ownership which prevents us from making statistically signifi-
cant results. On the other hand, using interviews allowed us to explain every case individually. 
Second limitation is perceived in ROA as performance indicator. Although it is recommended 
performance indicator for examining the relation between corporate governance and perform-
ance, international companies sometimes divert monetary resources to their mother companies 
for purposes of lowering their profit in the Czech Republic (and returning taxes in their original 
countries). And third, we calculated ROA for a single year. Series of ROA calculated for several 
consecutive years could help to eliminate year-to-year deviations in financial performance. Un-
fortunately, some of the organizations were not able to provide data for more than requested year 
and calculating ROA for several consecutive years would reduce the research sample. These limi-
tations will be taken into consideration in future research design. Thus, our future research will 
be conducted with emphasis on enlarging the sample size and more detailed financial analysis. 
Generally, we found prevalence of the effective governance configuration what points at gradual 
and steady application of corporate governance principles from well developed economies. On 
the other hand, 40 % of organizations demonstrate governance configuration not corresponding 
to up to date corporate governance principals. We proved a difference between domestically and 
internationally owned companies since internationally owned companies displayed statistically 
significant higher ratio of the effective governance configuration. Nevertheless, we did not get 
the evidence that the only effective governance leads to good organizational performance. Even 
the strong executive and the strong ownership can assure good organizational performance, 
despite those configurations are not consistent with general recommendations. Our paper sheds 
light upon these two governance configurations, explores the conditions under which these con-
figurations can be successful and, points at their risks and limitations.
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